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Abstract
Adaptive security is based on the observation that the se-
curity requirements of a system or service heavily depend on
the environment in which they operate and should therefore
be dynamically adjusted to best operate within that envi-
ronment. In this paper we are concerned with adapting the
choice of cryptographic algorithms applied to client-server
interactions. To that end, we design and implement an
adaptation controller for SSL (Secure Socket Layer), called
Adaptive SSL.
1 Introduction
Applications for adaptive security have been proposed in
areas such as mobile ad-hoc networks, where current net-
work conditions play a role in choosing relevant security
protocols at runtime, e.g., [2]. Media streaming research
proposes the use of additional contextual information, in
the form of an intelligent routing infrastructure, to allow
for flexible security levels [4]. There have also been pro-
posals to provide adaptive system security through system
event monitoring [6]. The inspiration for this paper however
comes from web sites or e-commerce applications. Man-
aging the security of such applications are non-trivial and
requires a plethora of technologies, including firewall, en-
cryption technologies, intrusion detection, single sign-on
techniques, etc. In this paper, we consider adaptation of
the protocol used to secure the communication channel be-
tween an application or web server and the client. In par-
ticular, we consider adaptation of the Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) protocol [3].
Adaptive SSL (ASSL) aims to provide appropriate se-
curity mechanisms for SSL sessions at any particular mo-
ment in time as the environment changes. Attributing en-
vironmental factors could include the threat level, server
load, transaction type, or client attributes such as process-
ing power, bandwidth, type of client, etc. These factors
are monitored by specialized third party applications who
inform ASSL of affected clients and appropriate security
measures.
In this paper we present the design and implementation
of Adaptive SSL, and study the overhead of the approach.
Although this paper reports on a considerable amount of
work, it should be considered work-in-progress towards a
(self-)adaptive security solution, in which SSL can be flex-
ibly manipulated in order to change security levels, at run-
time and automatically.
2 Design of Adaptive SSL
2.1 SSL
SSL is a solution for confidentiality, integrity and non-
repudiation of messages at the Transport Layer, which has
been standardized through the Transport Layer Security ef-
fort [3]. An SSL secure transport layer connection is
established through a handshake mechanism where algo-
rithms are selected for the aforementioned three security
properties, based on those available to both the client and
the server. This process is commonly known as SSL ne-
gotiation and the resulting connection is called a session.
Once established, the session can conduct a renegotiation,
but how and when this should be done is not specified in the
standard. Hence, it is left to the SSL implementation to de-
termine the extent to which to facilitate such renegotiation.
In this paper, we suggest a generic design for controlling
the renegotiation within SSL. We call the resulting system
‘Adaptive SSL’.
Web servers typically provide their own SSL implemen-
tation, leveraging existing SSL libraries, which extend SSL
with rule-based decision making to initiate the renegotiation
process. Renegotiation decisions in web servers are typi-
cally based on the location (such as the directory in which
the requested data is stored) and the type of the data re-
quested. The decision rules are usually determined prior to
starting the web server.
Fig. 1 depicts a standard web server request-response
processing cycle during an SSL secured session. The num-
bers in the figures indicate the event order and the labels the
interaction type. Events with the same number indicate a
decision point and only one of the events take place. Fig. 1
shows the client sending an encrypted request to the server
in step 1. The request is initially passed to SSL which then
queries the web server’s configuration file (where the rene-
gotiation decision rules are typically stored) and decides ei-
ther to process the request or renegotiate the session.
The disadvantage of the basic SSL approach is that se-
curity needs to be pre-configured and only predefined static
information, namely the data and its location, can be uti-
lized when making renegotiation decisions.
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2.2 Adaptive SSL
We propose a more flexible approach to session manage-
ment where renegotiation logic is decoupled from the main
SSL implementation and web server configuration. Sepa-
rating these concerns enables us to build a more powerful
adaptive security model since the renegotiation rules can be
determined and deployed independently and parallel to the
web server and its components.
The ASSL module effectively intercepts requests be-
tween the client and SSL module and, based on a set of
conditions, may decide to renegotiate the session security.
The set of conditions are specified and altered at run-time
by ‘third parties’, that is, other modules and programs such
as firewalls, system performance monitors, network moni-
tors, server administrators, etc. Note that the proposed so-
lution requires no changes to the client code and supports
traditional SSL interactions as well.
Fig. 3 is a magnified version of the ASSL module in
Fig. 2. It shows how ASSL adapts the session security, dur-
ing the request-response cycle in Fig. 2, based on conditions
specified in the Request Filter.
3 Implementation
3.1 SSL in Apache
Apache [7] is built on a modular design where nearly all
of its functionality is provided through modules. Modules
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may register an interest to manipulate a client’s request at
various points during the request-response processing cycle.
Apache provides various hooks to facilitate this (through the
ap hook API). Apache is configured using directives which
are read from a file at start-up (httpd.conf) or at runtime
through .htaccess files stored in the particular directories
accessed during a client request. Modules may also have
their own directives which can be included in these files.
SSL is one such module which integrates the OpenSSL
toolkit [8] into Apache. SSL session security is configured
through the SSLCipherSuite directive. This directive spec-
ifies a subset of security algorithms that can be used to es-
tablish a secure session with the client.
SSLCipherSuite directives may also be included in .htac-
cess files by web space owners and thus allow the session
security to be changed at runtime. Apart from the fact that
checking and parsing .htaccess files introduces certain over-
head, we decided against using these files in Adaptive SSL
because renegotiation directives can only be specified us-
ing the available predefined static information, such as the
directory accessed and filetype, thus limiting it’s use in dy-
namic environments where we may wish to adapt security
based on connection- or client information.
3.2 Adaptive SSL
Adaptive SSL is also implemented as an Apache module
and can be installed on existing Apache installations as it
requires no additional Apache source code changes. The
significant parts are detailed below:
Hooks. ASSL registers a number of hooks with Apache
in such a way that they are interleaved with existing SSL
hooks, in essence forming a wrapper round SSL session
renegotiation and so taking control of the SSL renegotiation
functionality without altering the existing SSL implementa-
tion.
Request Filter. The request filter is a sequence of [con-
dition, SSLCipherSuite] pairs on which the security of a
session with the client will be renegotiated if one of the
conditions match the client request and the current session
security is not a subset of the newly selected SSLCipher-
Suite. Each condition in the list is checked in turn and the
first that matches is selected, much in the same way as fire-
wall filters. Conditions are formulated using the powerful
SSLRequire directive. Each condition is an arbitrarily com-
plex boolean expression which can make use of standard
CGI, Apache and SSL related variables. Section 4 provides
a sample expression.
The SSLRequire directives are expressed using an ex-
tensive subset of contextual information at the right level
of abstraction. It uses only contextual information relating
to the end-to-end client server connection (which is the pri-
mary concern of SSL), nothing higher (application context)
and nothing lower (data context).
Handler. ASSL also registers a content generator, or
handler (see Fig. 3), which handles all third Party requests
to Apache to insert condition pairs in the Request Filter.
This provides a platform independent and secure means (al-
lowing third party verification) by which the security can be
changed as all third Party requests are made over HTTPS.
4 Overhead Analysis
The following section details a performance evaluation
of our Adaptive SSL module to ascertain its suitability for
runtime SSL session management. In each experiment
we compare Apache’s SSL implementation to a ‘best’ and
‘worst’ case performance scenario for Adaptive SSL. In the
best case the Request Filter list is empty and in the worst
case the Request Filter list contains twenty complicated
boolean expressions, such as the following.
%{SSL_CIPHER} =˜ m/ˆ(EXP|NULL)/
and %{SSL_CIPHER} =˜ m/AES256/
and %{SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE} < 52
and %{REMOTE_ADDR} =˜ m/ˆ192.76.162.[0-9]+$/
and %{REQUEST_FILENAME} =˜ m/secure/
and %{REMOTE_URI} =˜ m/.mov/
and %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} =˜ m/ˆMozilla/
When evaluating a client request, each expression evalu-
ates to false and so every expression in the Request Filter is
evaluated for each client request. ASSL+ represents ASSL
with a full Request Filter (the worst case scenario).
We first consider the security overhead for a single client
request in experiment 1, to gain insight in the absolute time
spent in the ASSL module. Experiment 2 evaluates the ef-
fect of this overhead on the server by stressing the server
and determining the maximum number of requests it can
process at any one time.
Experimental environment. All experiments were
conducted on a 2.80GHz Intel Pentium 4 with 2GB RAM,
running Apache 2.2.3 on Linux Fedora Core 5 (Kernel
2.6.17.11). SSL negotiations were performed with a 1024
bit RSA key and the RSA-DES-SHA1 cipher suit was uti-
lized. OpenSSL 0.9.8d toolkit was used by Apache’s SSL-
Protocol
Stage SSL ASSL ASSL+
Negotiation 115 * *
Renegotiation 2 61 423
Wait for client 71768 * *
Decryption 354 * *
Table 1. Average processing times, in mi-
croseconds.
and our module. The SSL enabled Apache server was
benchmarked using workload generated by Httperf [5]. Au-
tobench [1] was used to simulate a request flow from mul-
tiple clients located on a number of machines. All requests
were for a 44 byte index.html file.
4.1 Experiment 1
Table 1 shows the average time the server takes to pro-
cess various stages of the client request before content for
the response can be generated. Stages include the server
processing time consumed during negotiation, renegotiation
and request decryption. ”Wait for client” indicates server
idle time during the negotiation between client and server.
A * indicates that the values are the same as for SSL.
The table shows that in the best case scenario ASSL in-
troduces about 60 microseconds overhead in the renegotia-
tion phase compared to SSL. This increases when the Re-
quest Filter demands more processing, up to close to half
a millisecond (423 microseconds). To put this into per-
spective, the table shows that these amounts are easily out-
weighed by the time SSL spends in waiting for the client,
for instance. The overhead of ASSL in absolute numbers
thus seems very minor. Note also that although SSL’s use
of .htaccess files for runtime security changes does not show
up in SSL renegotiation time, it does increase Apache’s re-
quest processing time depending on the size of the file. This
overhead is avoided by ASSL.
4.2 Experiment 2
The maximum number of requests the server can pro-
cess at any one time depends greatly on client usage pat-
terns. We therefore conduct two experiments, one where the
clients establish few new SSL sessions and the other where
the clients establish a new SSL session per request. In real-
istic situations, the client behavior will be a mixture of these
two extremes. We evaluate the overall effect of using ASSL
in these extreme scenarios.
Scenario 1. In this experiment we evaluate ASSL’s per-
formance for the case that clients create minimal new SSL
sessions. To that end, 1000 requests are made per session
and SSL sessions are reused. In this scenario, the server
spends proportionately more time checking for renegotia-
tions than negotiating new connections, which should pe-
nalize ASSL’s performance.
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Figure 4 shows that when using ASSL, Apache expe-
riences peak load between 30% and 85% of the maximum
number of requests that SSL can support, depending on the
Request Filter length and complexity. So, we indeed see
that checking if renegotiation is in order can be costly and
will reduce the amount of clients that can be supported by
a server. Note again that this client behavior represents an
extreme case.
Scenario 2. In this experiment we evaluate ASSL’s per-
formance when clients create the maximum number of new
sessions, namely one session per request. In this scenario,
SSL does more work and so ASSL has minimal effect on
server performance.
Figure 5 shows that even when using a full Request Fil-
ter the server incurs negligible additional overhead when
using ASSL under normal client workloads. However, the
performance breaks down when the server reaches peak
load, and we think this is because we hit another bottle-
neck. We observed that the number of child processes cre-
ated by Apache rapidly increases for ASSL and ASSL+ un-
der peak load. This likely due to requests waiting for a lock
on the Request Filter which results in Apache not releas-
ing resources allocated to that request. Apache was config-
ured with a theoretical limit of 40000 child processes and
so we believe that the drop in performance is likely due to
the number of connections that can be supported by the sys-
tem itself. In our implementation we used Apache Portable
Runtime (APR) platform independent lock implementation,
and one would have to implement a bespoke locking and
threading solution to remedy the observed behavior. This is
beyond the scope of our work.
Summarizing, we conclude from Experiment 1 that the
amount of overhead introduced by ASSL indirection is
small (about 60 microseconds), but that the overhead is sen-
sitive to the contents of the Request Filter (moving up to the
order of milliseconds). When stressing the server (Experi-
ment 2), much depends on the client behavior, which deter-
mines what proportion of processing time is spent executing
the Request Filter. In general terms, the added functionality
of being able to adapt the security level comes at a cost that
only becomes prohibitive when the Request Filter is com-
plex and executed in vain too often.
5 Future work
The presented research is preparatory work to create a
self-adaptive security solution based on flexible use of rene-
gotiation in SSL. Our work shows that the overhead associ-
ated with the proposed Adaptive SSL design and implemen-
tation is small in absolute numbers (per request), but that
one should guard against unnecessary processing. These
results encourage us to now further research the deploy-
ment of Adaptive SSL in a realistic scenario (in particu-
lar, an email service), and establish strategies that optimize
the trade-off between security and performance (overhead
as well as server performance) when renegotiating security
levels.
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